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Abstract 
We present empirical evidence on whether the introduction of the euro has changed the effect of 
economic fundamentals on the growth rates of euro countries’ GDPpc and GDPpc volatility. We find 
that the effect of increments in debt on economic growth exhibits a structural break in 1999. A 
robustness check attributes this break to the financial crisis, however. There is also a statistically 
significant structural break in the impact of increments in government debt on economic uncertainty. 
This result is robust to a battery of robustness checks, including exclusion of the recent financial crisis 
period and comparison with non-euro European countries. 
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1 Introduction
It is now well known that the primary benets of monetary union for the members are lower
transaction costs and lower ination. Yet, a currency union also has costs; asymmetric economic
shocks and a lack of exible adjustment mechanisms can o¤set the economic benets associated
with a common currency (see Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) and De Grauwe (1992) for an
empirical investigation and Eichengreen (1991) for a survey of earlier works). When members
of a currency union have heterogeneous preferences on monetary policy, consensus can be hard
to achieve.1 As a consequence, there are likely impacts of economic fundamentals, such as
government debt, on both economic growth and economic uncertainty when a country joins a
currency union. Adoption of the euro by the rst 12 euro zone countries, surely one of the
most important events in the recent history of central banking and monetary policy, provides
a natural laboratory for testing these questions.
Mundells (1961) seminal work initiated an important line of research on optimum currency
unions. Alesina and Barro (2002), Barro and Tenreyro (2007), and Frankel and Rose (2002)
studied the e¤ect of the adoption of a common currency by a set of heterogeneous countries on
certain macroeconomic variables, such as volume of trade, price stability, and output.2 We are
not aware of any work that studies the specic question of whether adoption of the euro has
changed the structural e¤ect of fundamentals on economic growth and growth volatility. Our
goal is to provide empirical evidence on this important question.
Our approach in empirical. We consider the rst 12 European countries that adopted the
euro and conduct a cross-sectional empirical analysis between 1980 and 2011. We perform two
main tests on the hypothesized change of the e¤ect of economic fundamentals after adoption of
the euro in 1999. The rst test takes the GDPpc growth rate as the dependent variable, while
the second uses GDPpc growth rate volatility. The regression strategy in both tests follows
two steps. We rst recuperate the residuals from a panel regression of GDPpc growth rates
on country and time xed e¤ects. A ltered growth rate would not reect the growth rate
from a countrys specic economic structure or for a specic year. In the second step, we take
these residuals as a proxy of GDPpc growth rates, and the square of the residuals as a proxy
of GDPpc growth rate volatilities. In both tests we see whether each coe¢ cient is di¤erent and
statistically signicant before and after the introduction of the euro. If coe¢ cients are di¤erent,
1See Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010).
2In particular, Alesina and Barro (2002) analyzed the trade-o¤ between volume of trade and price stability
in the formation of a currency union; Barro and Tenreyro (2007) investigated the impact of currency unions on
bilateral trade and the extent of comovements of prices and outputs; and Frankel and Rose (2002) quantied
the e¤ect of common currencies on trade and output.
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we say that there has been a structural break in the e¤ect of the particular variable.
We do nd that adoption of the euro introduces a statistically signicant structural break in
the coe¢ cient that measures the e¤ect of government borrowing on economic growth. Before
1999, increments in government debt had no signicant impact on economic growth, while after
adoption of the euro a 1 percentage point increment in debt reduced growth by 4.3 percent.
The e¤ect of the growth rate of government debt on economic growth, however, seems to be
driven by the nancial crisis period of 2008-2011. Thus, we cannot relate this structural break
in the impact of government debt on economic growth only to adoption of the euro.
Our work is empirical in its nature and contributes to the academic debate on the relation
between public debt and growth by focusing on the euro zone countries and controlling for the
historic changes in their monetary institutions. Note that our analysis also controls for country
and time xed e¤ects and for other important variables, such as interest rate, savings, public
revenues, ination, employment, trade, and exchange rate.
On the other hand, before 1999 a 1 percentage point increment in government debt reduced
the volatility of the GDPpc growth rate (uncertainty) by more than 10 percent, while the same
increment increased uncertainty after adoption of the euro by more than 12 percent. These
e¤ects are large and of opposite signs, and statistically signicant, supporting the existence
of a structural break. The economic intuition behind these e¤ects can be summarized as
follows. When new government debt happens to be denominated in a common currency, a
member of that currency union can no longer (perfectly) a¤ect the nominal value of its debt
through monetary policy. Thus, when the mechanisms available to a country to reduce the
burden of debt are reduced (or eliminated), new debt increments may weaken economic growth,
particularly when new public investments produce at a rate lower than the debts interest rate.
Moreover, new debt may increase economic uncertainty since a country that loses the instrument
of monetary policy also loses the ability to stabilize the e¤ect of leverage in the economy.
Interestingly, this second main result on a structural break in the e¤ect of increments in
government debt on economic uncertainty is robust to exclusion of the recent nancial crisis
(2008-2011 period). Thus, this result is robust to the recent sovereign debt crisis that a¤ected
many of the 12 sample countries in the panel that we consider. Furthermore, to test the
results we repeat the empirical analysis for the European countries that did not adopt the euro.
This test clearly indicates that this structural break is specic to the euro countries, and thus
attributable to adoption of the euro.
All other economic fundamentals, except for imports, exhibit no structural break in their
impact on GDPpc growth and its volatility. Imports exhibit a statistically signicant structural
break for the level of the GDPpc growth rate. This break is such that the coe¢ cient after the
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euro adoption is 0.005. This result is consistent with predictions made by Frankel and Rose
(2002) on the positive e¤ect of the adoption of a common currency on trade and income.
Moreover, the low coe¢ cient supports the evidence provided by Tenreyro and Silva (2010),
who nd only a small increase in trade after adoption of the euro. Our robustness checks
indicate that the statistically signicant structural break in the coe¢ cient of imports is robust
to the exclusion of the nancial crisis period, nor is it seen in the set of non-euro European
countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers a simple model specication that iden-
ties relevant economic fundamentals that a¤ect economic growth and uncertainty. Section 3
presents the empirical analysis of the e¤ect of fundamentals on economic growth. There, we
discuss the data and regression strategy, summarize the main ndings, and check the robust-
ness of the results. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis of the e¤ect of fundamentals on
economic uncertainty in a similar fashion. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix further explains
the robustness checks, namely (i) exclusion of the nancial crisis period 2008-2011; (ii) consid-
ering as additional control variables the exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and each euro
zone countrys currency; and (iii) re-running the main regressions for the non-euro European
countries (control group).
2 Model Specication
Our contribution in this paper is empirical. However, one would like to have a simple model
specication that identies relevant economic fundamentals that a¤ect economic growth, as
measured in terms of the growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (GDPpc). To this
aim, we follow the seminal work on optimal currency unions by Alesina and Barros (2002).
The nal output in their model is a function of the total factor productivity (A), the amount
of labor employed (L), and nondurable intermediate inputs, both produced nationally and
imported from another country. For the latter, we consider one intermediate input produced
by country 1, denoted by K and with associated price 1t , and one intermediate input imported
from country 2; denoted by M . We omit transaction costs from the analysis; for a study of
the e¤ect of transaction costs on trade in the euro zone, see Tenreyro and Silva (2010). We
add government expenditure (G) as an additional input variable to the production function.
The economic intuition is that there are productive government expenditures, such as public
infrastructure, education, and the health system, that also a¤ect the nal level of GDPpc. The
production function of a representative rm in country 1 in period t is:
Yt = AtGtL
1 1 2
t K
1
t M
2
t : (1)
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As is common in the growth literature, the variable Yt refers to country 1s production (GDPpc)
at the end of period t, while the variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) are dated as
of the beginning of the period. Notice that we can express government expenditure Gt as
a function of new government debt Bt,3 government revenue from taxes Tt, gross national
savings (GNS) St, and the debt inherited from the previous period and associated interests
Rt  (1+ it)Bt 1, where it denotes the period t interest rate on previous government debt. The
decomposition obeys the standard government budget constraint Gt+Rt = Bt+ Tt, where the
left hand side of the equation is the expenditure side and the right hand side is the revenue side.
After some algebra (see the Appendix), we are able to obtain the main equation that we use in
our empirical analysis. GDPpc growth is expressed as a function of previous year growth rates
of government borrowing, revenue, interest on debt, savings, imports, prices, and employment.
_Yt
Yt
=  0
_At
At
+  1
Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
+  2
Tt
Gt
_Tt
Tt
+  3
St
Gt
_St
St
+  4
Rt
Gt
_Rt
Rt
+  5
_Mt
Mt
+  6
_1t
1t
+  7
_Lt
Lt
; (2)
where _Xt  dXtdt denotes the variation with respect to time of a representative variable Xt =
Yt; At; Bt; Tt; St; Rt;Mt; 
1
t ; Lt. Variables _Bt=Bt; _Tt=Tt; _St=St and _Rt=Rt are weighted by their
respective weight with respect to government expenditure. For instance, the weighted growth
rate of new government borrowing Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
is measured as the percentage of new debt with respect
to government expenditure. This is consistent with our measure of variables Bt and Gt as a
percentage of national GDPpc.
Equation (2) shows the e¤ect of fundamentals on the GDPpc growth rate. The growth rate
of total factor productivity in our empirical analysis below corresponds to the intercept in the
regression strategy. The second covariate is the weighted growth rate of government borrowing,
and, as we will see below, it is the variable that drives our main results. The remaining
covariates are derived from the growth model presented above and will be called controls.
Omitting these controls may produce results exaggerating the e¤ect on the growth rate
of government borrowing. Our analysis omits any endogeneity issues arising between debt,
revenues, and interest rate.4
Our goal in the empirical sections below are to determine the sign of the coe¢ cients in
equation (2). For this exercise, we must pay attention to variables such as government debt,
interest on previous debt, and imports, whose nominal value depends on monetary policy
(through prices) and exchange rates. We expect such variables to experience a structural break
after 1999, once debt and imports from other euro countries became denominated in euros.
3In the literature, government debt is also referred to as public debt, see Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010). Note
also that here, as in Barros (1979) theory, growth rate of debt is independent of the debt-income ratio.
4See also Barros (1974) and Barro (1979).
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Our general goal is to provide the rst empirical evidence on whether there has been a
structural break in the coe¢ cient of the important economic fundamentals after 1999. For this,
we rst reinterpret the elasticity parameters j, j = 1; 2 as follows:
j =
8><>:
j for t  1999;
j + j for t > 1999:
We say that there was a structural break in the e¤ect of government borrowing on economic
growth experiences in 1999 if its coe¢ cient in equation (2),  1 =
3
1 1 , is such that 1 6= 0,
3 6= 0, or both. Similarly, we can dene a structural break for the remaining covariates.
A plausible explanation of why government debt may experience a structural break is the
following. Exchange rate policy a¤ects the value of government debt issued in terms of a
foreign currency (sovereign bonds).5 By adjusting the exchange rate appropriately, a country
can reduce the value of its debt, and thus alleviate the burden of debt. When a country enters
a common currency arena, however, the exchange rate between this country and the other
countries in the common currency is xed, so there is no mechanism available for this country
to stabilize the specic shocks to the countries of the currency area. (To evaluate the robustness
of our results, we run additional regressions that include the growth rate of the exchange rate
between the currency of each country in the common currency area and the U.S. dollar; see
Edison and Melvin (1990) for a survey of early empirical papers that point out the importance
of the e¤ect of exchange rate variability on trade.)
Without exchange rate responses in a common currency, the interest rate becomes the key
tool to hedge country-specic shocks. That is, when a country adopts a common currency, the
only remaining way for the country to a¤ect the value of its debt is via monetary policy, but
as we argue below, the e¤ect of this action is at best imperfect.
In order to understand the e¤ect of government debt on economic growth and uncertainty
when a country gives up its own monetary policy, we draw here the lines of a simple two-period
model. We assume an economy where government debt issued in the rst period is used only for
public investment (transfers to households are not considered), and in the second period there
is uncertainty as to realization of the marginal productivity associated with levered government
5The value of the debt depends on whether a country can inuence the value of the currency in which the
debt is denominated. To see this, we can rewrite gross government borrowing Bt as a function of the exchange
rate Xt as Bt = ~Bt=Xt, where ~Bt is new borrowing in terms of the foreign currency, e.g., the issuance of
sovereign bonds. It may also happen that government debt ~Bt is issued in terms of the countrys own national
currency. If so, country 1 can reduce the burden of debt by printing money, also called debt monetization,
only if it has its own monetary policy. Then, one can interpret the ratio 1=Xt as the governments cost of issuing
new debt, and nd that Bt = ~Bt=Xt is reduced when the government monetizes its debt.
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public investment. In the simplest scenario there are two states in the second period. In one
state the returns from investing the public levered funds (marginal productivity mpg) exceed
the interest rate on government borrowing (r), i.e., mpg > r, and in the other the opposite
happens, mpg < r, i.e., the returns from the public levered investment are not enough to pay
the interest on the debt.6
If the country is subject to a common currency, the monetary policy mechanism it has
available to reduce the burden of the debt via price levels is imperfect at least from the individual
countrys point of view.7 In that case, if the state mpg < r happens to occur, issuing new debt
becomes a tax, hampering economic growth. Moreover, when there are no monetary policy
tools, a positive probability of occurrence of the second state of nature (mpg < r) increases
the uncertainty of a stable growth path for the country. A country with its own national
currency can use monetary policy actively to o¤set the shock by reducing the interest rate r.
Such a country has the ability to monetize its debt and reverse the inequality, making public
investments protable, and thus boosting economic growth. This possibility also mitigates the
uncertainty about the protability of the countrys public levered investments.
3 E¤ect of Fundamentals on Economic Growth
We rst describe the data and the methodology we use to examine a possible structural break
in the impact of fundamentals on economic growth caused by introduction of the euro. We are
mainly interested in the e¤ect of government debt. Following equation (2), the other variables
used to explain the growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita are the growth rates
of government revenue, gross national savings, interest on borrowing, imports, ination, and
employment. Many of these additional control variables are important indicators that central
banks use to determine the health of the economy when setting monetary policy.
3.1 Data
The data on real GDPpc come from the International Macroeconomic Data Set of Economic
Research Service (ERS). The data on 10-year interest rates on government bonds come from
6This second state, although extreme, has been observed in some euro countries during the recent nancial
crisis (e.g., Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal). We could have considered a less extreme state of nature,
where the returns from the public levered investment are not enough to absorb a negative demand shock.
7A standard channel to reduce the burden of government debt is by creating ination. Sims (2012) points
out that joining the Euro meant that countries gave up the cushion of country-specic ination impacts on
debt burden.
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Bloomberg Data Services. The data on remaining variables are from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) database. In a robustness check of the regression we add exchange rates between
the U.S. dollar and each euro zone countrys currency. The data on exchange rates comes from
EconStats.8
The IMFs data are available at annual frequency. In our analysis the sample runs from 1980
to 2011 - this time interval puts similar weights to both the pre-euro and the after-euro periods.
We cover the rst 12 euro zone members: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemborg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.9 The total number of both cross-
sectional and time-series observations in our sample is 384. There are some missing observations
for some countries, so in some tests the sample size is reduced. All the economic variables are
rst transformed into growth rates, so causal e¤ects must be interpreted in terms of growth
rates of the variables.
We run the regressions with a time lag of one year for the covariate. Thus, the results should
be interpreted as causalities and not correlations. Using regressions with instantaneous e¤ects
(no time lag) would lead to an identication issue; that is, in that case we cannot identify
whether fundamentals cause economic growth and uncertainty or whether economic growth
and uncertainty cause fundamentals to change.
3.2 Regression Strategy
The regression strategy is based on two intuitive steps. We rst estimate residuals from a
panel regression of the GDPpc growth rate on country and time xed-e¤ects. We then take
the residuals as a proxy for GDPpc growth rates. The panel regression with country and time
xed e¤ects allows us to lter out the GDPpc growth rate. Thus, the ltered growth rate will
not reect the growth rate of the underlying euro zone countrys specic economic structure
and a specic year. The panel regression is:
git = i + t + it; (3)
where git  Yit Yit 1Yit 1 represents the level of GDPpc growth rate of country i at time t; Yit is the
country i real GDPpc at time t; i represents country is xed e¤ect; and t represents the time
8In March 1979 the European Community introduced what was known as the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in Europe. This was to
prepare European countries for the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union with its single currency.
9Some other Eurozone countries are not included in our analysis because of missing data. Most of these
countries had Communist regimes and did not make data publicly available. Other small countries such as
Andorra, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino are not included in the analysis.
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t xed e¤ect. The permanent e¤ect of the adoption of the euro should not be reected by any
specic euro zone countrys xed e¤ect or any specic years xed e¤ect. Roughly speaking,
the residual it captures an e¤ect that can be attributed neither to the economic structure of
country i nor to the economic events associated with a particular year t. Thereafter, we take
as a proxy for the real GDPpc growth rate the tted residual ^it:
^it = git   ^i   ^t; (4)
where ^i and ^t are the estimates of the country and time xed-e¤ects, respectively. In the
second step and to examine the e¤ect of government debt and other fundamentals on the proxy
for GDPpc growth rate before and after adoption of the euro, we run the panel regression:
^it+1 = i + (1 +  1Ii;t)Debti;t +
JX
j=2
 
j +  jIi;t

Xj;i;t + ui;t+1; (5)
where i denotes the country-specic e¤ect, Ii;t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
country i adopted the euro in year t or before, and a value of 0 otherwise, and ui;t+1 denotes
the idiosyncratic error term. The variable of interest to us is country is weighted growth rate
of government debt at time t, here denoted by Debti;t: The growth rates of country is other
potential economic fundamentals (or controls) at time t are denoted by Xj;i;t; for j = 2; :::; J .
It is worth noting that in the panel regression (5) the coe¢ cients of the impact of government
debt and of the other controls are di¤erent before and after adoption of the euro. Before the
euro the coe¢ cients are given by j and after the adoption by j +  j; for j = 1; :::; J . If an
economic fundamental j has the same e¤ect on the level of GDPpc growth rate before and after
adoption of the euro, an equality must hold:
j = j +  j;
and thus the coe¢ cient  j must be equal to zero.
For example, testing whether adoption of the euro has changed the e¤ect of the growth rate
of government debt on the level of the GDPpc growth rate is equivalent to testing the null
hypothesis:
H0 :  1 = 0; (6)
against the alternative:
H1 :  1 6= 0: (7)
The rejection of H0 against H1 will imply that there is a structural break in the impact of the
growth rate of government debt on the level of the GDPpc growth rate due to introduction of
the euro. Furthermore, comparison of the sign and the magnitude of the coe¢ cients j and
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j + j will identify the direction of the changes and indicate whether the e¤ect strengthens or
weakens after adoption of the euro.
As it is usual in empirical work, see Frankel and Rose (2002), we run regressions with and
without controls and try to be conservative in our interpretation. Results of a rst simple
regression with the growth rate of government debt as the only independent variable appear in
Table 1. We see a clear statistically signicant structural break after 1999. Before adoption of
the euro the e¤ect of government debt growth rate on GDPpc growth rate is not signicant,
but after it the e¤ect is negative. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in government
debt after the euro reduced the GDPpc growth rate by 3.527 percent.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
3.3 Results and Discussion
We use the data to estimate the regression equation (5) and test the null hypothesis (6) against
the alternative hypothesis (7). The estimation results are summarized in Table 2. As all
economic variables are transformed in the same way (into growth rates) and are without units,
the coe¢ cients that measure the impact of fundamentals on GDPpc growth rate are comparable.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 reports a statistically insignicant e¤ect of government debt on the GDPpc growth
rate before adoption of the euro. With introduction of the euro, however, there is a structural
break in the impact of government debt that is statistically signicant even at the 1% signif-
icance level. That is, after 1999 a 1 percentage point increment in government debt reduces
economic growth by more than 4 percent. This result is robust to the inclusion of the exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and each euro zone countrys currency, see Table 4, but not to
exclusion of the recent nancial crisis, see Table 3.
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010) and Reinhart, Rogo¤, and Savastano (2003) attribute the fact
that increments in government debt dampened economic growth to the high debt/GDPpc
levels. Our paper contributes to the academic debate on the relation between the growth rate
of government debt and economic growth by focusing on the euro zone countries and controlling
for the historical change of their monetary institutions, country and time xed e¤ects, and for
other macroeconomic variables.
Government revenue exerts no signicant e¤ect on economic growth either before or after
1999. We see later that this insignicant e¤ect of government revenue is robust to exclusion
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of the nancial crisis and to the inclusion of exchange rate as an additional control variable.
Thus, these results suggest government revenue plays no part in a structural break on economic
growth.
Gross national savings also have no signicant e¤ect on economic growth either before or
after the euro, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (6) for GNS. Its lack of
statistical signicance is robust to exclusion of the nancial crisis or inclusion of exchange rate
in the regression (5).
Interest on previous debt exhibits a signicant structural break with adoption of the euro,
with a negative coe¢ cient of  0:360. This statistically signicant structural break in the e¤ect
of interests on previous debt is robust to inclusion of exchange rate as an additional control
variable, but not to exclusion of the nancial crisis.
Imports appear to have a statistically signicant e¤ect on economic growth both before and
after adoption of the euro with coe¢ cient estimates equal to  0:104 and 0:005; respectively.
This result is consistent with the predictions of Frankel and Rose (2002) on the positive e¤ect
of the adoption of a common currency on trade. The small coe¢ cient of 0:005 also supports
evidence provided by Tenreyro and Silva (2010), who nd only a small increase in trade after
adoption of the euro. Our robustness exercise indicates that the e¤ect of imports accounted
is robust to exclusion of the nancial crisis period, but it disappears and becomes statistically
insignicant before and after the euro once we control for the growth rate of exchange rates.
Ination has a very statistically signicant and negative e¤ect on economic growth only
before adoption of the euro. Thus, we nd no evidence of a structural break in this e¤ect, even
when we exclude the nancial crisis period or include the exchange rate as an additional control
variable. However, we nd that the non-euro European countries experience a structural break
after 1999 in the impact of ination on economic growth.
Finally, the employment growth rate has no statistically signicant e¤ect on the GDPpc
growth rate at any time. This result is conrmed when we exclude the nancial crisis period
and when we include the growth rate of exchange rates.
3.4 Non-Euro Countries
One might ask whether the results reported in Table 2 are seen in the non-euro European
countries. To investigate this question, we run regression (5) using data on the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The total number
of both cross-sectional and time-series observations in this empirical analysis is 256.
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The estimation results for the period 1980-2011 are reported in Table 5. We see that gov-
ernment debt, government revenue, gross national savings, interest on borrowing, imports, and
employment, have no statistically signicant e¤ect on economic growth rate either before or
after 1999. Thus, these fundamentals exhibit no structural break with adoption of the euro.
Ination, however, exhibits a structural break in its e¤ect on the level of the growth rate of
GDPpc, reducing economic growth after 1999 for the non-euro countries.
Comparison of the euro and non-euro European countries indicates that our results are
specic to the euro zone countries, with the only possible exception of ination.
4 E¤ect of Fundamentals on Uncertainty
We now proceed to test the hypothesized change of the e¤ect of economic fundamentals on
GDPpc growth rate volatility after adoption of the euro in 1999.
4.1 Regression Strategy
Our investigation of gross domestic product growth rate volatility (economic uncertainty) uses
the same variables as those we use to investigate the level of the GDPpc growth rate. For
GDPpc volatility we consider a linear approximation (rst-order Taylor expansion) with the
same economic fundamentals and the same data as before. The two-step regression strategy is
similar also. (Morgan, Rime, and Strathan (2004) follow a similar two-step regression procedure
to investigate how integration of bank ownership across states has a¤ected economic volatility
within states.) We rst recuperate the residuals from a panel regression of GDPpc growth rate
on country and time xed e¤ects. Second, we take the square of these residuals as a proxy
of GDPpc growth rate volatility. The panel regression in step one allows us to lter out the
GDPpc growth rate volatility from the underlying countrys specic economic structure and
from a specic year xed e¤ect - the permanent e¤ect of the adoption of the euro should not be
reected by any specic year xed e¤ect. Formally, we run the panel regression (3). Thereafter,
we take as a proxy of real GDPpc growth rate volatility the square of the residual it:
\V olit (git) ' ^2it =

git   ^i   ^t
2
; (8)
where ^it is the tted residual, and ^i and ^t are the estimates of the country and time xed
e¤ects, respectively.10
10We have also consider another measure of GDPpc growth rate volatility given by the absolute value of the
residuals, \V olit (git) ' j^itj =
git   ^i   ^t, and the results are quite similar.
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In the second step and to examine the e¤ect of government debt and other fundamentals on
GDPpc growth rate volatility before and after adoption of the euro, we run the panel regression:
^2it+1 = !i + (1 + 1Ii;t)Debti;t +
JX
j=2
 
j + jIi;t

Xj;i;t + "i;t+1; (9)
where !i is the country-specic e¤ect; Ii;t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country
i adopted the euro in year t; and a value of 0 otherwise; Debti;t is country is weighted growth
rate of government debt at time t; Xj;i;t; for j = 2; :::; J , are growth rates of other potential
economic fundamentals in country i at time t; and "i;t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic error term.
The coe¢ cients of the impact of government debt and of other controls on GDPpc growth
rate volatility before and after adoption of the euro are given by j and j+j; for j = 1; :::; J;
respectively. If an economic fundamental j has the same e¤ect on GDPpc growth rate volatility
before and after adoption, the equality must hold:
j = j + j;
and thus the coe¢ cient j must be equal to zero. For example, testing whether the adoption
of the euro has changed the e¤ect of debt on the GDPpc growth rate volatility is equivalent to
testing the null hypothesis:
H0 : 1 = 0;
against the alternative
H1 : 1 6= 0:
The rejection of H0 against H1 will imply there has been a structural break in the impact of
government debt growth rate on GDPpc growth rate volatility attributable to introduction of
the euro. Comparison of the sign and the magnitude of the coe¢ cients j and j + j will
identify the direction of the changes and indicate whether the e¤ect strengthens or weakens
after introduction of the euro.
We rst provide a simple regression using the growth rate of government debt as the only
independent variable. The results are presented in Table 6. From this, we see that there
is a statistically signicant structural break in the impact of government debt on economic
uncertainty after 1999. Before introduction of the euro, government debt had a negative e¤ect
on the volatility of the GDPpc growth rate. This e¤ect became positive and moreover was
amplied after adoption of the euro.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
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4.2 Results and Discussion
After ltering gross domestic product growth rate volatility using equations (3) and (8), we run
regression (9) with all the economic fundamentals. The estimation results are summarized in
Table 7. Since all economic variables are transformed in the same way (into growth rates) and
are without units, the estimated coe¢ cients that measure the impact of the fundamentals on
GDPpc growth rates volatility are comparable.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
Table 7 reports a signicant structural break in the e¤ect of the growth rate of government
debt on economic uncertainty after adoption of the euro. Increments in government debt have
a negative e¤ect on GDPpc growth rate volatility before adoption, with a coe¢ cient estimate of
 10:526. The e¤ect becomes positive after adoption with a large coe¢ cient estimate equal to
12:257; meaning that an increase in government debt increases GDPpc growth rates volatility.
The last two columns indicate that the e¤ects before and after adoption are statistically very
signicant, conrming a structural break in the e¤ect of government debt. These results are
robust to exclusion of the nancial crisis, see Table 8, and to inclusion of exchange rate as an
additional control variable in the regression (9), see Table 9.
A 1 percentage point increment in government revenue reduced uncertainty by 35 percent
before introduction of the euro. This e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5% signicance
level. There is no structural break in its impact with exclusion of the nancial crisis period and
inclusion of exchange rates as an additional control variable.
Ination and the growth rate of gross national savings and employment are statistically
insignicant both before and after adoption of the euro, and thus we see no structural break
after 1999. These results are robust to the exclusion of the recent nancial crisis and to
controlling for the exchange rate.
Interest on borrowing shows a statistically signicant structural break after adoption of the
euro. After 1999 increments in the interest on previous debt led to an increase in economic
uncertainty. As in the case of government debt, this result can be ascribed to the fact that lack
of monetary policy in a country boosts uncertainty because of the interest burden. Robustness
tests indicate the structural break in the e¤ect of interests on borrowing is sensitive to exclusion
of the nancial crisis. This suggests that it is the recent European crisis that drives the e¤ect
of interest on uncertainty, and not adoption of the euro. Furthermore, when we control for
exchange rates the statistical signicance of this e¤ect falls from 5% to 10%.
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Finally, imports have a statistically signicant e¤ect on the GDPpc growth rates volatility
before and after the euro. This e¤ect is positive before adoption of the euro and negative after,
although the latter e¤ect seems not economically signicant (0.004). Thus, we can conclude
that increases in imports exhibit an almost negligible structural break for economic uncertainty.
This result is robust to exclusion of the nancial crisis period and to inclusion of exchange rates.
4.3 Non-Euro Countries
We again investigate whether these results can also be seen in the non-euro European countries.
We run regression (9) using data on the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. As before, the total number of both cross-sectional and
time-series observations is 256.
The estimation results for the period 1980-2011 are presented in Table 10. We see that
only interest on borrowing and imports experience a statistically signicant structural break
in their e¤ects on GDPpc growth rate volatility, and the latter is signicant only at the 10%
signicance level. Except for the e¤ect of interest on debt, comparison of euro and non-euro
European countries indicates that the results are particular to the euro zone countries.
5 Conclusions
The recent European debt crisis sparked a debate on the benets and costs associated with the
European Monetary Union. We contribute to this literature by providing rst evidence on the
e¤ects of several economic fundamentals on economic growth and uncertainty with adoption of
the European single currency.
Government debt appears to be the primary variable that exhibits a structural break. Ro-
bustness checks that control for the historical change of countriesmonetary institutions and
for other macroeconomic variables indicate that the structural break in the e¤ect of the growth
rate of debt on economic growth is driven by the nancial crisis. The statistically signicant
structural break in the e¤ect of the debt growth rate on economic uncertainty seems robust to
several robustness checks, including exclusion of the nancial period. The e¤ect of the growth
rate of imports on gross domestic product growth also experienced a structural break with a
positive but small e¤ect on growth after adoption of the euro. The remaining economic fun-
damentals either experience no structural breaks after 1999 or any changes are not robust to
exclusion of the recent nancial crisis or not specic to the euro zone.
Although some of our coe¢ cients seem to us very large, we try to not take them too lit-
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erally. Rather, we hope our results will help researchers and policy makers better understand
the benets and costs of adoption of the euro, providing more information on implementing
appropriate economic policies.
Our empirical results strongly suggest that future research should consider the idea of cre-
ating new permanent institutions, that might o¤set the negative structural changes induced
by the adoption of a common currency. De Grauwe (2011) contributes to this debate by ar-
guing that the recent government debt crisis in the Eurozone is due to a failure of economic
governance. Inspired by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina and Perotti (1999), Luque,
Morelli, and Tavares (2012) exploit a theoretical model that explains how an increase in GDPpc
volatility in a monetary union brings salience to the extreme options of moving towards a scal
union versus reverting to autarky. Roughly speaking, without further institutions like a scal
union, the adoption of the Euro by some European countries stands as a big obstacle for the
survival of the union as a whole.
Finally, recognize that we take a neutral position in the debate on adoption of the euro, trying
not to be swayed by popular arguments in favor of or against the euro. Our only purpose has
been to provide the rst empirical evidence on the e¤ects of fundamentals on economic growth
and uncertainty surrounding its adoption.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The production function
Here we indicate the main steps to derive our equation (2). First, we equate the marginal
productivity of the intermediate good produced in country 1 to its price 1t , obtaining:
Kt = (AtGt1=
1
t )
1=(1 1)(Lt)(1 1 2)=(1 1)(Mt)2=(1 1): (10)
The nal output produced by this representative rm can be written as follows:
Yt =

(AtGt)
1=1)M
2=1)
t (1=
1
t )
1=(1 1)
L
(1 1 2)=(1 1)
t : (11)
We next log-linearize equation (11) and take the derivative with respect to time on both
sides of the result, and obtain the di¤erential equation:
_Yt
Yt
=
1
1  1
 
_At
At
+
_Gt
Gt
!
+
2
1  1
_Mt
Mt
+
1
1   1
_1t
1t
+
1  1   2
1  1
_Lt
Lt
; (12)
where _Xt  dXtdt ; for Xt = Yt; At; Gt;Mt; 1t ; Lt; denotes the variation with respect to time of
variable Xt. Equation (12) presents the variables in growth rate and shows that GDPpc growth
rate depends on the growth rates of productivity, government spending, imports, ination, and
employment.
Thereafter, we disentangle the variable government expenditure Gt by writing the govern-
ments budget constraint in period t as follows:
Gt = 3Bt + 4Tt + 5St + 6Rt; (13)
where Bt is the new government debt, Tt is the government revenue from taxes, St is the gross
national savings (GNS), and Rt is the debt inherited from the previous period and associated
interests Rt. We now take the derivative of equation (13) with respect to time, and write
_Gt = 3 _Bt + 4 _Tt + 5 _St + 6 _Rt; (14)
After some simple algebra, we get:
_Gt
Gt
= 3
Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
+ 4
Tt
Gt
_Tt
Tt
+ 5
St
Gt
_St
St
+ 6
Rt
Gt
_Rt
Rt
: (15)
The growth rate variables on the right-hand side of equation (15) are weighted by their re-
spective weight with respect to government expenditure. For instance, we refer to Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
as the
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weighted growth rate of new government borrowing. In our empirical analysis below, each vari-
able in (15) enters as a percentage of government expenditure. For example, Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
is measured
as the percentage of new debt with respect to government expenditure. This is consistent with
our measure of variables Bt and Gt as a percentage of national GDPpc.
Combining equations (12) and (15) leads to the nal expression:
_Yt
Yt
=  0
_At
At
+  1
Bt
Gt
_Bt
Bt
+  2
Tt
Gt
_Tt
Tt
+  3
St
Gt
_St
St
+  4
Rt
Gt
_Rt
Rt
+  5
_Mt
Mt
+  6
_1t
1t
+  7
_Lt
Lt
; (16)
where  0 =
1
1 1 ;  1 =
3
1 1 ;  2 =
4
1 1 ;  3 =
5
1 1 ;  4 =
6
1 1 ;  5 =
2
1 1 ;  6 =
1
1 1 ; and
 7 =
1 1 2
1 1 :
6.2 Robustness Checks and Tables
To support the main ndings in Tables 2 and 7, we conduct several robustness checks
1. We exclude the nancial crisis by focusing on the period 1980-2007. The estimation results
are presented in Table 3 for economic growth and Table 8 for economic uncertainty. These
tables are comparable to Tables 2 and 7.
2. We consider as an additional control variable the exchange rates between the U.S. dollar
and each euro zone countrys currency. The estimation results using the whole period
1980-2011 are reported in Tables 4 and 9. In neither table is the growth rate of exchange
rates a statistically signicant variable before and after adoption of the euro.
3. We re-run the main regressions (5) and (9) using instead non-euro European countries:
Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom. This last exercise helps us see whether the results in Tables 2 and 7 characterize
simply the countries of the euro area.
Our main results that show structural breaks in the e¤ect of government debt on both
economic growth and uncertainty after introduction of the euro are consistent in all robustness
checks. In Tables 11 and 12 we summarize our primary ndings and the robustness results.
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Table 1: Impact of government debt on GDP growth level, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate level Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Govnt. Debt -0.476 -0.28 0.786
Govnt. Debt*Dummy -3.051 -2.93 0.015
Const. -0.037 -0.92 0.381
R-sq overall (%) 4.46
Note: This table reports estimation results for the panel regression
^it+1 = $i + (1 +  1Ii;t)Debti;t + vi;t+1;
where ^it+1 is the residual at time t+1 dened in (4), Debti;t is the weighted growth rate of government
debt at time t; $i is the country-specic e¤ect, Ii;t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country
i adopted the euro in year t; and a value of 0 otherwise, and vi;t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic error
term. The e¤ect of government debt on the GDPpc growth rate before adoption of the euro is  0:476,
while its e¤ect after adoption is  0:476   3:051 =  3:527: The total number of both cross-sectional
and time-series observations in our sample is 384. T-statistics are computed using robust standard
errors.  Signicant at 5%:
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Table 2: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth level, 1980-
2011
GDPpc growth rate level Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt -0.701 -0.84 0.403
Gov. Debt*Dummy -3.610 -2.59 0.010
Gov. Revenue -11.200 -1.51 0.132
Gov. Revenue*Dummy 2.453 1.24 0.807
Gross National Savings 0.925 0.16 0.875
Gross National Savings*Dummy 2.796 0.39 0.699
Interest on Borrowing 0.051 0.70 0.482
Interests on Borrowing*Dummy -0.411 -2.75 0.006
Imports -0.104 -2.51 0.013
Imports*Dummy 0.109 2.59 0.010
Ination -0.149 3.57 0.000
Ination*Dummy -0.062 -0.74 0.461
Employment 12.407 0.98 0.331
Employment*Dummy 21.683 1.22 0.222
Const. 0.583 2.77 0.006
R-sq overall (%) 19.09
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
rate level. The results correspond to regression equation (5). The e¤ect of economic fundamental
j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption by j +  j : For
example, in this table the e¤ect of government debt before adoption of the euro is  0:701, while its
e¤ect after the euro is  0:701   3:610 =  4:311: The total number of both cross-sectional and time-
series observations in our sample is 384. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
Signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%:
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Table 3: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth level, 1980-
2007
GDPpc growth rate level Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt 0.916 1.32 0.187
Gov. Debt*Dummy -0.152 0.11 0.913
Gov. Revenue -8.810 -1.44 0.153
Gov.t Revenue*Dummy -4.415 -0.47 0.640
Gross National Savings -1.107 -0.23 0.821
Gross National Savings*Dummy -1.872 -0.27 0.788
Interest on Borrowing 0.090 1.45 0.148
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy -0.161 -0.72 0.473
Imports -0.098 -2.84 0.005
Imports*Dummy 0.105 2.97 0.003
Ination -0.198 -5.25 0.000
Ination*Dummy -0.108 1.27 0.205
Employment 13.350 1.27 0.207
Employment*Dummy -1.776 -0.09 0.929
Const. 0.754 3.77 0.000
R-sq overall (%) 12.06
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
rate level. The results correspond to regression equation (5). The e¤ect of economic fundamental
j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption by j +  j : For
example, in this table the e¤ect of government debt before adoption of the euro is 0:916, while its
e¤ect after the euro is 0:916   0:152 = 0:764: The total number of both cross-sectional and time-
series observations in our sample is 336. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
Signicant at 1%:
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Table 4: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth level, control-
ing for foreign exchange rates, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate level Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt 0.737 0.69 0.509
Gov. Debt*Dummy -3.703 -3.49 0.006
Gov. Revenue -11.120 -0.84 0.419
Gov. Revenue*Dummy 2.507 0.26 0.803
Gross National Savings -0.919 -0.11 0.913
Gross National Savings*Dummy 4.649 0.41 0.693
Interest on Borrowing 0.057 2.19 0.053
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy -0.419 -4.02 0.002
Imports -0.102 -1.52 0.159
Imports*Dummy 0.107 1.58 0.146
Ination -0.154 -2.08 0.065
Ination*Dummy -0.063 -0.43 0.676
Employment 14.112 1.90 0.086
Employment*Dummy 19.995 1.10 0.299
Exchange Rate -0.907 -1.46 0.174
Exchange Rate*Dummy 0.907 1.46 0.174
Const. 3.661 13.81 0.000
R-sq overall (%) 35.19
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
level. In regression (5) we also control for exchange rates. The e¤ect of economic fundamental j before
adoption of the euro is given by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption by the coe¢ cient j +  j : The
total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations of our sample is 384. T-statistics are
computed using robust standard errors.  Signicant at 1%; and  signicant at 10%:
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Table 5: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth level, non-Euro
countries, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate level Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt 3.817 1.36 0.180
Gov. Debt*Dummy -1.371 -0.46 0.644
Gov.t Revenue 10.106 1.03 0.307
Gov. Revenue*Dummy -7.533 -0.55 0.581
Gross National Savings -8.530 -0.97 0.337
Gross National Savings*Dummy 8.775 0.88 0.383
Interest on Borrowing -0.209 -0.76 0.452
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy 0.274 0.71 0.479
Imports -0.002 -0.21 0.832
Imports*Dummy -0.024 -1.01 0.317
Ination 0.096 0.89 0.374
Ination*Dummy -0.459 -3.44 0.001
Employment 21.34 0.82 0.418
Employment*Dummy -32.490 -0.90 0.371
Const. 0.429 1.17 0.245
R-sq overall (%) 19.89
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
level, using a di¤erent sample of countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The results correspond to regression (5). The e¤ect of eco-
nomic fundamental j before adoption of the euro is given by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption
by coe¢ cient j +  j : The total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations of our
sample is 256. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors.  Signicant at 1%:
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Table 6: Impact of government debt on GDP growth volatility, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate volatility Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt -9.314 -3.15 0.002
Gov. Debt*Dummy 24.131 4.76 0.000
Const. 2.965 7.13 0.000
R-sq overall (%) 8.07
Note: This table reports estimation results for the panel regression:
^2it+1 = i + (1 + 1Ii;t)Debti;t + ei;t+1;
where ^it+1 is the residual at time t+1 dened in (4), Debti;t is the weighted growth rate of government
debt at time t; i is the country-specic e¤ect, Ii;t is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if country
i adopted the euro in year t; and a value of 0 otherwise, and ei;t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic error
term. The e¤ect of government debt on the GDPpc growth rate volatility before adoption of the euro
is  9:314, while its e¤ect after adoption is  9:314+24:131 = 14:817: The total number of both cross-
sectional and time-series observations in our sample is 384. T-statistics are computed using robust
standard errors.  Signicant at 1%:
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Table 7: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth rate volatility,
1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate volatility Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt -10.526 -5.15 0.000
Gov. Debt*Dummy 22.873 2.64 0.025
Gov. Revenue -35.379 -2.52 0.031
Gov. Revenue*Dummy 37.495 1.80 0.102
Gross National Savings -20.066 -0.46 0.654
Gross National Savings*Dummy -24.503 -0.44 0.669
Interest on Borrowing 0.147 0.46 0.655
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy 0.951 2.80 0.019
Imports 1.049 2.27 0.047
Imports*Dummy -1.045 -2.25 0.048
Ination 0.298 1.50 0.165
Ination*Dummy 0.181 0.87 0.406
Employment 71.958 1.14 0.281
Employment*Dummy -94.331 -0.92 0.381
Const. 1.691 2.96 0.014
R-sq overall (%) 31.39
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
rate volatility. The dependent variable (proxy of GDPpc growth rate volatility) is given by the square
of the residual it in (3). The results correspond to regression equation (9). The e¤ect of economic
fundamental j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption by
j+j : For example, in this table the e¤ect of government debt before adoption of the euro is  10 :526 ,
while its e¤ect after adoption is  10 :526 + 22:873 = 12:257: The total number of both cross-sectional
and time-series observations in our sample is 384. T-statistics are computed using robust standard
errors.  Signicant at 1% and  signicant at 5%:
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Table 8: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth volatility,
1980-2007 (without nancial crisis period)
GDPpc growth rate volatility Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt -11.190 -3.62 0.000
Gov. Debt*Dummy 14.993 2.54 0.012
Gov. Revenue -45.407 -1.68 0.095
Gov. Revenue*Dummy 41.379 1.01 0.316
Gross National Savings -2.730 -0.14 0.888
Gross National Savings*Dummy -12.085 -0.42 0.674
Interest on Borrowing -0.893 -3.50 0.001
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy -0.228 -0.23 0.817
Imports 1.061 7.37 0.000
Imports*Dummy -1.054 -7.17 0.000
Ination 0.729 3.80 0.000
Ination*Dummy 0.079 0.21 0.832
Employment 45.362 1.01 0.315
Employment*Dummy -15.088 -0.17 0.862
Const. -0.532 -0.58 0.564
R-sq overall (%) 38.87
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
rate volatility. The dependent variable (proxy of GDPpc growth volatility) is given by the square of
the residual it in (3). The results correspond to regression equation (9). The e¤ect of economic
fundamental j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption by
j+j : For example, in this table the e¤ect of government debt before adoption of the euro is  11:190,
while its e¤ect after adoption is  11:190 + 14:993 = 3:803: The total number of both cross-sectional
and time-series observations of our sample is 336. T-statistics are computed using robust standard
errors.  Signicant at 1%,  signicant at 5%; and  signicant at 10%:
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Table 9: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth volatility,
controling for foreign exchange rates, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate volatility Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt -10.430 -3.27 0.403
Gov. Debt*Dummy 22.597 4.25 0.000
Gov. Revenue -36.937 -1.31 0.193
Gov. Revenue*Dummy 38.108 0.99 0.321
Gross National Savings -20.495 -0.91 0.362
Gross National Savings*Dummy -24.490 -0.89 0.375
Interest on Borrowing 0.095 0.34 0.736
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy 1.029 1.79 0.075
Imports 1.037 6.55 0.000
Imports*Dummy -1.033 -6.42 0.000
Ination 0.275 1.72 0.087
Ination*Dummy 0.210 0.65 0.514
Employment 56.43 1.14 0.254
Employment*Dummy -78.506 -1.15 0.251
Exchange Rate -6.378 -1.79 0.075
Exchange Rate*Dummy 6.379 1.79 0.075
Const. 1.675 2.08 0.039
R-sq overall (%) 32.95
Note: This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth
volatility. The dependent variable (proxy of GDPpc growth volatility) is given by the square of the
residual it in (3). In regression (9) we also control for exchange rates. Recall that the e¤ect of
economic fundamental j before adoption of the euro is given by the coe¢ cient j ; and after adoption
by the coe¢ cient j + j : The total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations of
our sample is 384. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors.  Signicant at 1%, 
signicant at 5%; and  signicant at 10%:
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Table 10: Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth volatility,
non-Euro countries, 1980-2011
GDPpc growth rate volatility Coe¢ cient t-Statistic Prob.
Gov. Debt 0.013 0.00 0.998
Gov. Debt*Dummy 1.684 0.38 0.730
Gov. Revenue 10.169 0.19 0.862
Gov. Revenue*Dummy -7.863 -0.14 0.898
Gross National Savings -21.240 -0.85 0.457
Gross National Savings*Dummy 6.117 0.19 0.858
Interest on Borrowing -0.577 -12.93 0.001
Interest on Borrowing*Dummy 0.951 10.99 0.002
Imports 0.011 1.39 0.258
Imports*Dummy 0.024 2.82 0.067
Ination 0.260 0.91 0.432
Ination*Dummy -0.047 -0.12 0.912
Employment 42.719 0.86 0.454
Employment*Dummy -64.762 -0.72 0.523
Const. 1.179 2.03 0.135
R-sq overall (%) 5.42
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc
growth volatility, using a di¤erent sample of countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The dependent variable (proxy of GDPpc growth
volatility) is given by the square of the residual it in (3). The results correspond to regression (9).
Recall that the e¤ect of economic fundamental j before adoption of the euro is given by the coe¢ cient
j ; and after adoption by coe¢ cient j + j : The total number of both cross-sectional and time-
series observations of our sample is 256. T-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
Signicant at 1%, and  signicant at 10%:
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Table 11: E¤ect of fundamentals on economic growth
Fundamental
Stat. signicant
structural break
Robust to
exclusion of
nancial crisis
Robust to
exchange rate
Break for
non-euro
countries
Gov. Debt YES (-) NO YES NO
Gov. Revenue NO YES YES NO
GNS NO YES YES NO
Interest on debt YES (-) NO YES NO
Imports YES (+) YES NO NO
Ination NO YES YES YES
Employment NO YES YES NO
Note: This table summarizes the ndings in the main Table 2. YES indicates there is an e¤ect,
and NO that there is no e¤ect.  Signicant e¤ect at 1%:
Table 12: E¤ect of fundamentals on uncertainty
Fundamental
Stat. signicant
structural break
Robust to
exclusion of
nancial crisis
Robust to
exchange rate
Break for
non-euro
countries
Gov. Debt YES (+) YES YES NO
Gov. Revenue NO YES YES NO
GNS NO YES YES NO
Interest on debt YES (+) NO YES YES
Imports YES, but small (imp= 0:004) YES YES YES

Ination NO YES YES NO
Employment NO YES YES NO
Note: This table summarizes the ndings in Table 7. YES indicates there is an e¤ect, and NO
that there is no e¤ect.  Signicant e¤ect at 1%,  signicant e¤ect at 5%; and  signicant e¤ect
at 10%:
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